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david r. nolte*

Exxon v. Baker: Legislating Spills into the Judiciary:
How the Supreme Court Sunk Maritime Punitive
Damages

In exxon shipping co. v. baker,1 the supreme court of the United States
considered three issues surrounding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill: (1) whether in
maritime law a corporation could be held punitively liable for the reckless actions of
the ship’s captain; (2) whether federal statute implicitly barred awarding punitive
damages; and (3) if punitive damages were allowed, whether the $2.5 billion
awarded by the Ninth Circuit was excessive in accordance with maritime common
law.2 Justice Alito took no part in the decision of the case.3 As a result of Justice
Alito’s absence, the Court was evenly split and unable to reach a decision on
Exxon’s derivative liability, so the Ninth Circuit’s disposition on this issue was
undisturbed.4 As to the second issue, the Court unanimously held that the federal
statute does not implicitly bar punitive damages in maritime law.5 However, the
Justices ruled five-to-three that punitive damages should be limited to a 1:1 ratio as
a matter of maritime common law.6 By failing to reach a majority on the analysis of
punitive derivative liability in maritime law, the Court missed an opportunity to
resolve a circuit split and adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”)
derivative liability rule, as used by the Ninth Circuit.7 Further, the Court should
have analyzed Exxon’s claim that the punitive damages award was excessive under
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1. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
2. Id. at 2614.
3. Id. at 2634; see also Robert Barnes, Justices Assess Financial Damages in Exxon Valdez Case, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2008, at A2 (noting that Justice Alito recused himself because of his stockholdings in Exxon).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
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the traditional due process standard.8 Rather, the Court framed the punitive
damages question and analysis solely on maritime common law, paradoxically
claiming it mandates a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, despite
maritime case law that suggests judicial deference to Congress, which left punitive
damages uncapped.9 In so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to address
confusing due process case law.10 Rather, the Court rendered an outcome-based
decision by framing the grant of certiorari in a manner that did not consider due
process and was likely motivated by the majority’s belief that Exxon already paid
sufficient damages for the 1989 oil spill in other cases.11 Unfortunately, this holding
will affect future maritime litigation regarding punitive damages resulting from
egregious or grossly negligent behavior, including BP’s potential liability in the
recent 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.12
i. the case

In 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska’s pristine
Prince William Sound, spilling millions of gallons of oil into the surrounding
waters.13 Prior to the accident, the ship’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood, unexpectedly
left the bridge minutes before the ship was about to make a difficult maneuver.14
Expert witnesses testified that Hazelwood’s actions were unjustified because his
absence left only one officer on the bridge when two were required by law, and the
remaining officer was not certified to navigate the channel.15 Additionally, it was
later discovered that Hazelwood was intoxicated at the time of the crash16 and that
Exxon had prior knowledge of his recurring alcohol problem.17 Further, Hazelwood
ordered the crew to “rock” the tanker in an attempt to free it from the reef, which
may have caused more oil to spill.18


8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.4.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).
Id. at 2612.
Id. “A special license is needed to navigate the oil tanker [around Bligh Reef] in . . . Prince William
Sound, and Captain Hazelwood was the only person on board with the license.” In Re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d
1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (In re Exxon Valdez I).
16. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
17. Id. at 2612. There was evidence demonstrating that Hazelwood had previously drank on the job, Exxon
knew of Hazelwood’s drinking problem, and that some Exxon officials even drank with him. Id. Further, after
rehabilitation treatment, Hazelwood returned to work for Exxon, and there was no evidence that the company
monitored his activities. Id.
18. Id. at 2613.
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The disaster required billions of dollars to fund cleanup efforts,19 and Exxon pled
guilty to violations of various federal statutes such as the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”)20 and the Refuse Act,21 ultimately paying $125 million in fines and
restitution damages to the United States government.22 Additionally, Exxon paid
$900 million “toward restoring natural resources” to the state of Alaska and the
federal government and “another $303 million in voluntary settlements with
fishermen, property owners, and other private parties” around Prince William
Sound.23 The federal district court consolidated all civil cases seeking compensatory
damages into one action,24 along with thousands of plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages.25
The class action suit was organized into three phases:26 the first phase examined
the recklessness and potential punitive liability of Hazelwood and Exxon; the
second phase “set compensatory damages for commercial fishermen and Native
Alaskans;”27 and the third phase “determined the amount of punitive damages for
which Hazelwood and Exxon were each liable.”28 In the first phase of the trial, the
district court found that both Hazelwood and Exxon could be punitively liable for
the accident.29 In the second phase, “the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory
damages to the commercial fishermen,”30 while most Native Alaskans settled out of
court.31 In the third phase, the jury granted punitive damages in the amount of
$5000 against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon.32

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (2006).
33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (2006).
Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
Id.
See id. at 2613. Individual plaintiffs claiming compensatory damages against Exxon were divided into
three classes including “commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners.” Id.
25. Id. (“At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages, whose number topped 32,000.”).
26. Id.
27. Id. A separate civil action by the federal government and the State of Alaska resulted in a payment of
“$303 million in voluntary settlements with fisherman, property owners, and other private parties.” Id. at 2613.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2614. The jury’s instructions regarding corporate liability were:
[A] corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of those employees who are employed in a
managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their employment. The reckless act or omission of a
managerial officer or employee of a corporation, in the course and scope of the performance of his
duties, is held in law to be the reckless act or omission of the corporation.
Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at app. 301a, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008)
(No. 07-219)).
30. Id.
31. Id. A majority of the Native Alaskans settled for $20 million out of court, and “those who opted out of
that settlement ultimately settled for a total of around $2.6 million.” Id.
32. Id. The court instructed the jury on the purpose of punitive damages, emphasizing that such damages
were “designed not to provide compensatory relief but to punish and deter the defendants.” Id.
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Exxon appealed on various issues to the Ninth Circuit,33 which affirmed the
jury’s instructions on Exxon’s “corporate liability for acts of managerial agents
under Circuit precedent.”34 Exxon argued that it could not be held liable for
punitive damages for Hazelwood’s recklessness.35 Relying on Protectus Alpha
Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc.,36 the Ninth Circuit rejected this
assertion and upheld the district court’s decision that Exxon was derivatively or
vicariously liable for Hazelwood’s actions.37 In Protectus, the Ninth Circuit adopted
the Restatement’s position on punitive damages and apparent agency, holding that
a principal can be liable for its agent’s torts “not only where they are authorized,
ratified or approved [by the principal] and not only where the agent was unfit and
the principal was reckless in employing him, but also where he was employed in a
managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment.”38
When determining the amount of punitive damages, the Ninth Circuit
remanded twice for “adjustments,” relying on Supreme Court due process case law39
“before ultimately itself remitting the award to $2.5 billion.”40 In October of 2007,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari41 to consider three questions: (1) the extent of
Exxon’s corporate liability for Hazelwood’s recklessness, (2) whether federal
statutory law implicitly barred punitive damages, and (3) whether the $2.5 billion
punitive award was “excessive” under maritime common law.42 The Supreme Court
did not grant certiorari on the issue of constitutional due process limitations that
the lower courts had addressed.43


33. Id. Exxon appealed various issues including: the availability of punitive damages, the level of proof
described in the jury instructions, the sufficiency of evidence for the finding of punitive damages, and the
amount of punitive damages in proportion to compensatory damages. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215,
1225, 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
34. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
35. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1233.
36. 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985).
37. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1235.
38. Id. (quoting Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1386) (internal quotations omitted).
39. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614 (“[T]he Circuit [court] remanded twice for adjustments in light of this
Court’s due process cases before ultimately itself remitting the award to $2.5 billion.” (emphasis added)); see, e.g.,
In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1246–47; In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 625 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (In re Exxon Valdez II); see also infra Part II.B.
40. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
41. 552 U.S. 989 (2007).
42. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
43. See 552 U.S. 989 (2007) (stating that certiorari was granted “limited to Questions 1, 2, and 3(1)”);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 21, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219)
(stating that question three part one is whether punitive damages are limited by federal maritime law and
question three part two is whether punitive damages are limited by constitutional due process).

380

journal of business & technology law

NOLTE.PP3.DOC

6/14/2010 6:07 PM

David R. Nolte
ii. legal background

The main issues examined in Exxon are derivative liability for punitive damages,44
due process and maritime limitations on punitive damages,45 and maritime
common law.46 Specifically, Exxon examined the application of punitive derivative
liability in maritime cases and the interaction of punitive and compensatory
damages in maritime law.
A. Punitive Vicarious Liability in Maritime Law: What Level of Accountability Should
Apply to Corporations for their Agents?
It is generally accepted in American law that employers should be held vicariously
liable for compensatory damages caused by their agents.47 However, the assessment
of vicarious liability for punitive damages is not as clear because, while the law
recognizes that employers should have some form of liability for the action of their
employees, many courts believe that “employers should not be fully exposed to
vicarious liability for punitive damages.”48
Assessing punitive damages through vicarious or derivative liability initially
evolved in English law and was later adopted by American courts in the nineteenth
century.49 Today, derivative liability for punitive damages is divided among a
spectrum of rules, ranging from strict liability50 to no liability,51 with modern
maritime courts taking three mid-ground positions.52 Like land-based law,53 there is
a split among federal circuits in maritime law over whether to apply the

44.
45.
46.
47.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 119
(1997) (“From the beginning[,] American law has recognized that employers should generally be held
vicariously liable for compensatory damages resulting from the torts of their employees committed in the
course and scope of the employment.” (citing Justice Story’s opinion in Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546
(1818))).
48. Id.
49. Deborah Travis, Broker Churning: Who Is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive Damages in the
Context of Brokerage Houses and Their Agents, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1775, 1792 (1993).
50. At one end of the spectrum, courts will find the principal is strictly liable for punitive damages resulting
from the acts of its agents “regardless of actual authority or ratification.” Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 n.14 (1982) (quoting Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 288 P. 309 (Okla.1930)
(internal quotations omitted)). This rule was adopted because “it is in accordance with agency law that holds
principals liable when their agents commit a tortious act with apparent authority.” Muratore v. M/S Scotia
Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 354 (1st Cir. 1988).
51. On the other end of the spectrum, some courts refuse to find employers liable at all for punitive
damages resulting from their agent’s actions. See generally, Robertson, supra note 47, at 126–27.
52. See id. at 126.
53. See Travis, supra note 49, at 1792 (discussing the general split among non-maritime courts on
vicariously assessing punitive damages).
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Restatement’s view54 on derivative liability for punitive damages or to use other tests
that make it more difficult to find corporate liability.55
The Fifth Circuit, following the Sixth Circuit’s lead,56 adopted the most stringent
mid-ground rule for vicarious liability in In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc.,57 requiring
derivative liability for punitive damages when the corporation “authorizes or ratifies
wanton actions of an agent,” rather than applying liability merely when an
employee acts in the scope of his or her employment.58 The Fifth Circuit’s decision
in P & E Boat Rentals hinged on the lack of evidence that the company’s
“policymaking officials were aware” of their foreman’s practice, requiring captains
to travel at high speeds on the Mississippi.59 The discussion of “policymaking”
officials in P & E Boat Rentals is in accord with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the
corporation itself, not just its employees, must be “considered the wrongdoer.”60
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on an early 19th century maritime case,61 The
Amiable Nancy,62 where the Supreme Court held that owners of a ship could not be
punitively liable for the wrongdoing of the captain and crew where the owners
“neither directed . . . nor countenanced . . . nor participated . . .” in the wrongful
conduct.63

54. The Restatement (Second) of Torts allows punitive damages against a principle by acts of an agent
only if:
(a) the principle or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the
agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him,
or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment,
or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977).
55. See In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 n.84 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon v. Baker, 128 S. Ct.
2605 (2008) (stating that Fifth and Sixth Circuits rejected Protectus claiming that a principle must ratify the
actions of an agent for derivative liability); see also Robertson, supra note 47, at 126.
56. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Furhman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1146 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970)
(denying a vicariously assessed punitive damages award because the captain’s actions were not within
“authorized procedures dictated by the officials of [the ship owner,] United States Steel”) .
57. 872 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1989). In P & E Boat Rentals, two crew boats collided in heavy fog on the
Mississippi River, killing and injuring passengers. Id. at 644–45. The district court found that the captain of one
of the boats was negligent for not having a valid Coast Guard license, operating a vessel at excessive speed, and
failing to monitor the radar and use proper signals. Id. at 646.
58. Id. at 650 (emphasis added); see also id. at 652.
59. Id. at 652–53.
60. Id. at 652 (“In such a case [where employees acted on their own], the corporation itself cannot be
considered the wrongdoer. If the corporation has formulated policies and directed its employees properly, no
purpose would be served by imposing punitive damages against it except to increase the amount of the
judgment.”).
61. Id. at 650–51 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818)).
62. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818). In Amiable Nancy, the ship-owner of The Scourge, who was not on the
voyage, was only liable for compensatory damages and not for “vindictive damages” when The Scourge’s crew
plundered another ship. Id. at 546–47, 559.
63. Id. at 559. Further, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court later affirmed Amiable Nancy in the
1893, non-maritime case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice. See P & E Boat Rentals, 872
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Yet, other federal circuits have different tests to determine maritime derivative
liability.64 The First Circuit adopted a qualified version of the Restatement in CEH,
Inc. v. F/V Seafarer.65 To find derivative liability under the First Circuit test, the
agent must be employed in a managerial capacity and have acted in the scope of
employment, and the principal must have “some level of culpability for the
[agent’s] misconduct.”66 The First Circuit required this “some level of culpability”
standard because of its concern that under a strict reading of the Restatement, a
principal could be held liable where its managerial agent was acting within the
scope of his or her employment, but by no fault of the employer.67 While the First
Circuit did not specifically define its standard of “some level of culpability” in CEH,
the court determined that the employer met this standard of culpability because
“[n]ot only was there a complete delegation of authority in a troublesome work
situation, but also a complete absence of any policy directive, written or oral.”68
Finally, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Restatement’s69 view of punitive vicarious
liability in Protectus.70 In Protectus, the Ninth Circuit held that in a maritime case, a
principal may be liable for punitive damages resulting from the actions of a reckless
agent or actions of a manager within the scope of his or her employment.71 The
Ninth Circuit explained that the Restatement “better reflects the reality of modern

F.2d at 651 (“Seventy-four years later, the Supreme Court affirmed these punitive damage principles in Lake
Shore . . . .” (citing Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893))).
64. See In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 n.84 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (discussing various federal circuit approaches to punitive derivative liability); see
also Robertson, supra note 47, at 126.
65. 70 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 1995). In CEH, a lobster vessel owner, CEH, sued a fishing boat, her two captains,
and her owner for disturbing CEH’s lobster traps on the sea floor. Id. at 696–67. The fishing vessel, one captain,
and the owner were found liable, and the court awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 697–98.
The First Circuit found vicarious punitive liability in the owner of the fishing boat for “failure to provide any
supervision over his captains” and because the captain of the boat had “complete managerial discretion over the
means and methods of fishing.” Id. at 705.
66. Id. at 705.
67. Id. Other maritime statutes also include a culpability requirement. See, e.g., Limitation of Shipowners’
Liability (Limitation) Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). “The [Limitation] Act allows a vessel owner to limit
liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or
the owner’s interest in the vessel.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001). Justice Stevens
noted Exxon did not attempt to argue that the Limitation Act applied because of the difficulty it would face
alleging that Captain Hazelwood’s actions were not within the company’s “privity or knowledge.” Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635–36 & n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
(discussing application of the Limitation Act).
68. CEH, 70 F.3d. at 705.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54.
70. Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).
71. Id. The shipowner of the Protectus sued dock-owner, North Pacific, when North Pacific’s managerial
employee ordered the ship cast-off from its dock while a fire was being fought aboard the Protectus. Id. at 1381–
82. The court held that by casting the Protectus off from the dock, the North Pacific employee prevented the fire
department from putting the fire out. Id. at 1381–82. The court found the dock-owner negligent per se as well as
liable for punitive damages under the Restatement. Id. at 1382, 1387.
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corporate America,”72 emphasizing that “a corporation can act only through its
agents and employees, and that no reasonable distinction can be made between the
guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity acting within the scope of his
employment and the guilt of the corporation.”73
State courts are also split on this issue, with some states requiring corporate
approval or ratification,74 other states adopting versions of the Restatement,75and a
few states holding “employers liable for punitive damages on even broader
grounds.”76
B. Punitive Damages: Historical Origins and Due Process Considerations
Punitive damages are as ancient as the law itself and can be traced back to 2000
B.C.77 The theory of punitive damages has continued to be relevant throughout
history78 with authorities calling for punitive-like penalties when there were “certain
especially harmful acts.”79 Such punishment damages were first explicitly recognized
in England, when fines could be imposed “for more than the injury received” and
were later adopted into American common law.80 Historically, various theories have
been promulgated for the purpose of punitive damages,81 but today, most scholars
agree that punitive damages are primarily for retribution and deterrence.82 The
courts have awarded punitive damages in maritime law “where a defendant is
shown to have engaged in willful and wanton conduct.”83 Historically, punitive
damages served as an extra form of compensation in maritime law, because


72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1386.
Id.
See id. at 1386 (noting the division of authority on derivative liability and that a “majority of courts . . .
have held corporations liable for punitive damages imposed because of the acts of their agents, in the absence of
approval or ratification” (quoting Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 n.14
(1982)) (internal quotations omitted)).
75. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 575 n.14. For example, Idaho, Colorado, California, and Oklahoma follow
the Restatement. Id.
76. See Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1387.
77. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Call for
Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2008).
78. Id. at 743.
79. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008); see also Seiner, supra note 77, at 742–43
(discussing the progression of punitive damages throughout history).
80. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2620. (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (K.B.)); Seiner, supra
note 77, at 743–44.
81. See Seiner, supra note 77, at 743.
82. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“[P]unitive damages serve a
broader function [than compensatory damages]; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution.”).
83. See In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1989).
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significant compensatory damages for certain intangible injuries like pure economic
loss or emotional distress were not always available in maritime law.84
Prior to Exxon, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of vicarious punitive
damages85 and had only restricted the amount of punitive damages in maritime law
if it represented a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Fifth Amendment due
process clauses.86 Though the Supreme Court would later provide more guidelines
for determining the amount of punitive awards in all due process limitation cases,
the Court first emphasized its refusal to set a bright line rule,87 which was reflected
in maritime decisions by lower courts.88 After the Court espoused its first due
process analysis guidelines for all due process cases in 1996, courts applied these due
process guidelines to determine whether punitive damages were excessive in
maritime cases.89
The Court first outlined detailed guidelines for analyzing the constitutionality of
punitive damages in the 1996 case BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.90 Here, the
Supreme Court held that where compensatory damages totaled $4000, a $2 million
punitive damages award violated both substantive and procedural due process.91
The majority opinion rested its conclusion primarily on procedural due process,

84. See, e.g., Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (“General maritime law
limits the availability of compensatory damages.”); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 437 n.11 (2001) (stating that before the types of available compensatory damages “broadened,”
punitive damages were historically used in courts to compensate for intangible injuries); Gough v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of America, 996 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that compensatory damages for emotional
distress under maritime law will only be awarded when the plaintiff demonstrates there was physical impact or
injury); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[C]laims for economic
loss unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest [a]re not recoverable in maritime tort.”).
85. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (holding that punitive respondeat superior
liability of a corporation for the actions of an employee, and in the absence of any wrongdoing by the
corporation, was not a violation of the corporation’s due process). Specifically, the Haslip Court stated that
finding a corporation liable for its agent’s wrongdoing in the scope of his or her employment without
wrongdoing by the corporation “is not fundamentally unfair and does not in itself violate the Due Process
Clause.” Id.
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, §1; Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2619, 2626; Brief in Opposition at 28–
29, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219).
87. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (“We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. . . .
[H]owever, . . . general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.”).
88. See CEH Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming punitive awards of $10,000
and $50,000 in a maritime case, even though compensatory damages were less than $7,000).
89. See, e.g., Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 241, 262–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to
overrule a punitive damages award of $7 million in a maritime case as excessive when the court awarded $2.6
million in compensatory damages). In Silivanch, the court determined a cruise line was negligent for an
outbreak of Legionnaires Disease, a type of pneumonia, on its ship. Id. at 250, 262–63.
90. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
91. Id. at 585–86. The wrongdoing consisted of BMW’s decision not to inform dealers of pre-delivery
damage to vehicles, which amounted to necessary repairs totaling less than three percent of the vehicle’s value.
Id. at 562–63. The lower court awarded the respondent $4,000 in compensatory damages, reflecting the
diminished value of a “repainted BMW” and $2 million in punitive damages for BMW’s concealment. Id.
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emphasizing the right to notice of potential liability or criminality.92 The Gore Court
outlined three “guideposts” to help determine the permissible extent of punitive
damages including: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility,” (2) “the disparity between
the harm or potential harm” and the punitive damages award, and (3) “the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.”93 Additionally, the Court recognized a need for a “higher ratio”
of punitive to compensatory damages where “the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.”94
Declining to set forth a bright-line test, the Supreme Court has struggled with
the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages. In 2003, the Supreme
Court again struck down punitive damages on due process grounds in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.95 The Court held that damages were
excessive when $145 million was awarded punitively with only $1 million awarded
for compensation.96 Using the guideposts from Gore, the Court emphasized that
“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”97 The Court refused to
state or apply a specific formula to determine punitive damages.98
More recently, in 2008, the Fourth Circuit held in EEOC v. Federal Express
Corp.99 that a punitive damages award for the violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was constitutional even though it was 12.5 times the
compensatory damages award.100 Specifically, the court recognized that the ratio is
only one aspect of the Gore guideposts and found the award was reasonable because
it was well within the ADA statutory $300,000 cap on total damages.101
Additionally, the Court has struggled with considering harm to others in the
“degree of reprehensibility” guidepost. In 2007, the Supreme Court addressed due
process concerns about punitive damages in the context of a cigarette smoker’s
death in Philip Morris USA v. Williams.102 In a five-to-four decision, the Williams
Court decided that punitive damages awarded, even in part, to punish for harm to
non-parties is a violation of the due process clause and therefore unconstitutional.103

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 582.
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. at 412, 418.
Id. at 425.
Id. (“We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”).
513 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378 (“[T]he punitive damages award was plainly reasonable in light of at least three relevant
factors: reprehensibility, proportionality, and the statutory cap.”).
102. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Decedent’s estate sued Philip Morris, claiming that Philip Morris’ conduct misled
decedent into thinking cigarette smoking was safe. Id. at 349–50.
103. Id. at 353.
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However, the Court further confused104 the issue by stating that it is permissible to
address harm to others in the Gore reprehensibility guidepost.105
Thus, while it seems clear that the Supreme Court has set some due process
limitations on punitive damages, the Court has never set a specific ratio or limit on
punitive damages.
C. Maritime Law and Damages
Maritime law, also known as admiralty law,106 is predominantly judge-made law and
within the federal court’s jurisdiction,107 but Congress also has the power to create
or change maritime law through legislation so long as its actions comport with the
Constitution.108 The federal courts were given jurisdiction over maritime law in
Article III of the Constitution.109 Federal courts are allowed to “draw on the
substantive law inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and to
continue the development of this law within constitutional limits.”110 The Supreme
Court has recognized its role in maritime litigation, stating that “the Judiciary has
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law


104. See Wendy Rose Parcells, A Monumental Decision or Just an Environmental Catastrophe? An In-Depth
Look at the Ramifications and Shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (2008) (“[T]he Williams [sic] decision is imprecise and left uncertainty and
confusion as to how a jury is to be instructed . . . . The Supreme Court’s holding was contradictory.”).
105. Williams, 549 U.S. at 355. Specifically, the Court stated:
Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff
also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—
although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others
nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet . . . a jury may not go further than
this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is
alleged to have visited on nonparties.
Id.
106. See Debra D. Burke, Cruise Lines and Consumers: Troubled Waters, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 694 & n.30
(2000) (stating that although the Constitution refers to all cases of “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” that
the words “‘admiralty’ and ‘maritime’ are almost synonymous,” with “maritime” reflecting a more general term
not limited to the law).
107. Id. at 694 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619
(2008) (recognizing that maritime law is largely judge-made (quoting Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979))).
108. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932) (“In amending and revising the maritime laws, the
Congress cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2619 (noting that maritime law is largely
common law but subject to Congress’ authority “to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result”).
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending federal appellate court jurisdiction to “all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction”).
110. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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maritime, and ‘Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for
fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.’”111
Yet, despite the Supreme Court’s influence in this area of law, there are many
maritime statutes.112 For example, the courts are required to look to the Jones Act
when determining tort damages available to a decedent sailor.113 Through the
Limitations Act, Congress explicitly limited the derivative liability of ship-owners if
the employee’s wrongdoing was not within the ship-owner’s “privity or
knowledge.”114 Most importantly, there are no maritime statutes explicitly limiting
the size of punitive damages in a derivative liability case,115 and prior to Exxon, the
Court had never considered limitations on the size of punitive damages within
maritime common law.116
iii. the court’s reasoning

In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the United States Supreme Court was split equally
in its ruling on derivative liability; thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on apparent
agency remained undisturbed.117 However, the Court unanimously118 held that

111. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975) (citing Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co.,
374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)).
112. See, e.g., Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 1920), Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); The Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (imposing a general
limit of liability on vessel owners); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPPA), 43 U.SC. §§ 1651–1655
(2006).
113. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (stating that the court must look to the Jones Act
to determine the extent of damages available to a decedent sailor, since the Act “limits recovery to losses
suffered during the decedent’s lifetime” (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (current
version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30104–05 (2006)))).
114. The Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505(b) (2006); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 439
(2001) (“The Limitation Act allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the
owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner’s interest in the vessel.”). The Supreme
Court in Exxon recognized that Exxon did not attempt to argue the Limitation Act applied because of the
difficulty it would face alleging Captain Hazelwood’s actions were not within the company’s “privity or
knowledge.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635–36 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting) (discussing application of the Limitation Act).
115. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (“In light of the many statutes governing liability under admiralty law, the
absence of any limitation on an award of the sort at issue in this case suggests that Congress would not wish use
to create a new rule restricting the liability of a wrongdoer like Exxon.”).
116. See id. at 2619–20 (majority opinion) (“Exxon raises an issue of first impression about punitive
damages in maritime law . . . . [Exxon] argue[s] that this award exceeds the bounds justified by the punitive
damages goal of deterring reckless (or worse) behavior and the consequently heightened threat of harm.”); Brief
in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29.
117. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (stating that if a court is equally split, there can be no order and no reversal
(citing Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 (1869))). Noting that the Court was equally divided, Justice
Souter held that it would “leave the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed,” and thus the derivative liability
decision is not precedential. Id. There were only eight Justices presiding because Justice Alito, an owner of
Exxon stock, took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 2634; A Punitive Ruling: Supreme Court Strayed
When It Reduced Damages Paid to Exxon Valdez Oil-Spill Victims, HOUS. CHRON., June 30, 2008, at B6.
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statutory law did not implicitly bar punitive damages119 and ruled in a five-tothree120 decision that the $2.5 billion award against Exxon should be reduced to no
more than the compensatory damages for the case under maritime common law.121
A. An Evenly Split Court Left the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Exxon’s Derivative
Liability Undisturbed
The Justices could not align a majority on the issue of whether maritime law allows
derivative liability of a principal for a captain’s actions.122 Exxon argued, in line with
the Fifth and Sixth Circuit,123 that maritime precedent barred application of
derivative liability to the ship-owner by citing two nineteenth century cases that
held that punitive damages are not available against a ship-owner for a captain’s
recklessness without the ship-owner’s explicit ratification.124 Baker countered that
the Restatement should prevail, citing the Ninth Circuit decision in the instant case
and Protectus,125 while distinguishing Exxon’s cases.126 The Restatement permits
“corporate liability in punitive damages for reckless acts of managerial employees”
acting within the scope of their employment.127 Since the Justices were at a
stalemate, the Court left the Ninth Circuit’s judgment undisturbed, finding Exxon
liable, and stated that this ruling was not precedential.128


118. Justice Souter’s opinion holding that statutory provisions did not bar punitive damages was joined by
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer
concurred regarding statutory preemption, but dissented in the Court’s holding on reducing the punitive
damages. See id.
119. Id. at 2619.
120. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in the Court’s holding on reducing the punitive
damages. Id. at 2634 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and
dissenting); id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Id. at 2634 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 2616.
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. Exxon first relied on The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818), for establishing that shipowners are not derivatively liable. Id. at 2614–15. Furthermore, Exxon said the principle was affirmed in a later
case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, where in a tort action against a railroad company,
the Court held that an employer is only liable for compensatory damages, and not punitive awards. Id. at 2615–
16 (citing Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893)).
125. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (citing Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767
F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Restatement rule on derivative liability for punitive damages is the
law in the Ninth Circuit)).
126. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616. Exxon relied on the Fifth and Sixth Circuit line of cases, Amiable Nancy and
Lake Shore, disclaiming any derivative punitive liability. See supra note 123; supra Part II.A. Baker claimed that
Amiable Nancy was only dicta “because punitive damages were not at issue” and that Lake Shore “merely
rejected company liability for the acts of a railroad conductor, while saying nothing about liability for agents
higher up the ladder, like ship captains.” Id.
127. Exxon, 128 S.Ct. at 2616 (citing 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1977)).
128. Id.
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B. The Court Unanimously Agreed that Federal Statutory Law Does Not Preempt
Punitive Damages
Exxon argued that the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) barred any punitive damages
available at common law.129 The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim on the merits130
and the Supreme Court affirmed this assertion on both procedural and substantive
grounds.131 Though the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
in reaching its decision on procedural grounds,132 the circuit decision did not turn
on the procedural issue, so the Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not abuse its
discretion.133
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits, finding that
because Congress was silent on the availability of punitive damages in the CWA,
common law was not preempted.134 The Court was not persuaded that the CWA, “a
statute expressly geared to protecting ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ and ‘natural resources’
was intended to eliminate sub silentio oil companies’ common law duties to refrain
from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals.”135 Thus, the Court,
having already affirmed by way of a split decision the Ninth Circuit’s finding of
common law derivative liability, found that the federal statute did not preempt
punitive damages in maritime law.136
C. A Closely Divided Court Restricted Punitive Damages to a 1:1 Ratio with
Compensatory Damages
Next, the Court determined the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages. Unlike the Ninth Circuit and district court’s analysis that confronted due
process restrictions on punitive damages, the Supreme Court only granted
certiorari on the question of whether maritime common law restricted the ratio of

129.
130.

Id.
In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1231 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008).
131. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616, 2618.
132. Id. at 2616–18. The district court rejected the defendant’s claim that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act preempted punitive damages. Id. at 2616–17. After the district court’s decision, Exxon filed a
motion “almost thirteen months after the stipulated motions deadline,” arguing that two recent cases
demonstrated that the rule on punitive damages in maritime law was “displaced by federal statutes, including
the CWA.” Id. at 2617. The district court denied this motion, but Exxon raised it again in the Ninth Circuit. Id.
While the Ninth Circuit recognized the lateness of Exxon’s motion, it held that it should not be denied on
procedural grounds because “Exxon had consistently argued statutory preemption throughout the litigation,
and the question was of massive . . . significance.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that the defendant’s motion was not timely, but ultimately left the discretion of the
Ninth Circuit intact because the ruling did not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 2618 n.6.
133. Id. (“We do have to say, though, that . . . if the case turned on the propriety of the Circuit’s decision to
reach the preemption issue we would take up the claim that it exceeded its discretion.”).
134. Id. at 2618–19.
135. Id. at 2619.
136. Id. at 2618.
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punitive to compensatory damages and did not undertake a constitutional analysis
using due process case law.137 Exxon argued that maritime common law prevented
an award of this magnitude138 for punitive damages, stating that the “award
exceed[ed] the bounds justified by the punitive damages goal of deterring reckless
(or worse) behavior and the consequently heightened threat of harm.”139 The Court
ultimately agreed, restricting punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory
damages.140
The majority compared the use of punitive damages in various states and
nations, and determined that many states have imposed statutory limits141 on
punitive damages and that the United States has a higher and more frequent rate of
punitive awards than any other country.142 The majority then distinguished Exxon
from “constitutional level” cases that discussed the “due process standards that
every award must pass.”143 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted that
although the Court refused to set a hard-line formula in the due process cases, “‘few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.’”144
However, Justice Souter explained that such due process cases differed from the
case sub judice because this review only dealt with maritime common law, “which
precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard.”145 The
Court stated that the due process cases originated out of state common law and
thus provided federal review only on the constitutional issue.146 However, the Court
in the instant case was not considering the intersection of punitive damages and due
process, but rather the regulation of punitive damages in maritime law, over which
the federal courts have jurisdiction.147 Thus, in the absence of any statute, the
responsibility of determining punitive damages in maritime common law is in the
Court’s discretion since maritime law is regulated by federal courts.148 Specifically,

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra note 43; see also Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29.
The award issued by the Ninth Circuit was $2.5 billion. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
Id. at 2619–20.
Id. at 2634.
Id. at 2623–25. The Court noted that many states have put a monetary cap or ratio cap on punitive
damages based on the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 2623.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2626 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).
144. Id. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).
145. Id. at 2626. The Court noted that constitutional due process cases have dealt with awards subject to
state law restrictions, whereas in this case, the court deals with the intersection of federal maritime law at
common law. Id.
146. Id. (“[T]he only matter of federal law within . . . [the Court’s previous due process cases] appellate
authority was the constitutional due process issue.”).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2626–27 (“Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their intersection with the
Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with
this Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of statute.”).
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Justice Souter noted that while Congress maintains “superior authority” in
maritime law, legislative inaction did not prohibit the Court from setting a
limitation.149
Next, the Court created a standard for limiting punitive damages in a maritime
case. Because the Court stated that it had jurisdiction to review this case under
maritime common law and not due process standards, the Court did not use the
guideposts established in the due process cases.150 Rather, the Court first listed the
goals of punitive damages, stating that the award must be “reasonably predictable”
and not “excessive.”151 The majority then considered the different ways of
determining the appropriateness of damages, by looking at various state methods,152
and analyzing both verbal and quantitative tests.153 Ultimately, the Court decided
that quantitative tests were the superior method.154
Specifically, the Court stated that a ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages was the most effective means of determining the reasonableness of
punitive damages.155 Noting that few states have a ratio higher than 3:1, the majority
considered whether a 3:1, a 2:1, or a 1:1 ratio would be best.156 Justice Souter
reasoned that a 3:1 ratio was inappropriate because states usually enact such harsh
ratios for “cases involving some of the most egregious conduct, including malicious
behavior and dangerous activity carried on for the purpose of increasing a
tortfeasor’s financial gain,” as opposed to the facts in Exxon’s case, which, the
majority stated, did not rise to the level of malicious conduct.157 The majority also
rejected a 2:1 ratio (treble damages), stating that it applied in areas of law vastly
different from maritime law, particularly where private suits are rare and thus
require inducement to supplement governmental enforcement, but that such

149. Id. at 2630 n.21. Justice Souter explained that “[w]here there is a need for a new remedial maritime
rule, past precedent argues for our setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course to congressional
revision.” Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2627.
152. Justice Souter explained that the Court’s analysis was based on maritime common law, and not the
constitutional boundaries considered in other Supreme Court due process cases. Id. at 2626–27. To aid its
analysis, the Court then examined various state court analyses, based on state common law as guidance for how
maritime common law should consider its punitive damage limits, separate from the due process analysis. Id. at
2627–28. The Court explained that previous Supreme Court due process cases have considered state common
law before constitutional considerations, but, ultimately, “could provide no occasion to consider a commonlaw standard of excessiveness.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989)
(internal quotations omitted)).
153. Id. at 2627. For example, the Court described verbal tests such as Maryland’s “nonexclusive list of nine
review factors” such as “degree of heinousness” and the value of deterrence, as well as Alabama’s factors
including “actual or likely harm” and whether the defendant made a profit off of the harm. Id. at 2627–28.
Quantitative methods described include ratios or caps. Id. at 2629.
154. Id. at 2629.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2631–33.
157. Id. at 2631–32.
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inducement was not needed here.158 Ultimately, the Court ruled that a 1:1 ratio was
appropriate, because the median of punitive damages in similar civil cases was
below this 1:1 standard.159 Also, the Court wanted to protect against “awards that
are unpredictable and unnecessary.”160
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred, supporting the holding as
consistent with prior case law such as State Farm, but also stating his disagreement
with the outcome of those cases.161
Justin Stevens concurred with the Court’s ruling on derivative liability and
federal statutory preemption.162 However, he dissented on the issue of the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages.163 Specifically, he argued that the Court should
not impose restrictions on punitive damages where Congress had not, and that
there should be an abuse of discretion review standard.164 Justice Stevens stated that
while a large proportion of maritime law is judge-made, a large component of it is
also statutory, so the legislature should determine any limits on damages.165 He
argued that because Congress chose not to limit punitive damages, the Court
should not proactively do so,166 nor should it “overstep the well-considered
boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”167 Specifically, Justice Stevens examined
current statutes that demonstrated Congress’s ability, yet reluctance to limit
punitive damages.168 Further, Justice Stevens stated that maritime law generally
limits compensatory damages, which may be why Congress chose not to limit
punitive awards.169 Justice Stevens further noted that caps and ratios are typically
imposed legislatively and the majority could not cite any state court decision that
“imposed a precise ratio” as the majority did here.170

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 2632.
Id. at 2633.
Id.
Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Gore, Scalia wrote “the Due Process Clause provides no
substantive protections against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.” BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting).
163. Id. at 2634–35.
164. Id. at 2635.
165. See id. at 2634–35.
166. Id. at 2635.
167. Id. at 2635 (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
168. Id. at 2635. Justice Stevens argued that Exxon’s case did not fall within the purview of the Limitations
Act, which limited the liability of a ship-owner if there was no wrongdoing within the ship-owner’s “privity or
knowledge.” Id. at 2635. Additionally, Justice Stevens cited the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, which
restricted certain damages, but explicitly did not restrict punitive awards. Id. at 2636.
169. Id. at 2636–37.
170. Id. at 2637. The majority responded to Justice Stevens’ criticism, claiming that the legislature has
“largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules for admiralty law.” Id. at 2630
n.21 (majority opinion). Justice Souter argued that where a new rule is needed in maritime law, precedent
points to “setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course to congressional revision.” Id.
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Justice Ginsburg dissented in the Court’s ruling regarding the ratio as well,
arguing that while the Court has the power to make a restriction, it should refrain
from doing so.171 Justice Breyer also dissented, arguing that while he recognized the
need to limit punitive awards, the Exxon case was especially egregious and
warranted an award above the Court’s ruling of a 1:1 ratio.172
iv. analysis

By failing to reach a majority on how derivative liability in maritime law should be
applied, the Court missed an opportunity to adopt, with precedential effect, the
Restatement rule on derivative liability.173 Furthermore, the Court should have
analyzed the punitive damages award under due process case law because maritime
law had only ever considered this constitutional limitation.174 The Supreme Court
usurped the legislature’s role and created a new rule in maritime common law
restricting punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages.175 The Court
did this despite Congress having set no limits on punitive damages in maritime
derivative liability cases and maritime common law, which suggests courts should
defer to Congress.176 The Court preempted analysis of due process limitations by
granting certiorari only to assess maritime common law limitations on punitive
damages, and may have been motivated to enact such a strict ratio to prevent Exxon
from having to pay any more damages for the 1989 oil spill.177 By creating an
arbitrary new standard, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify the existing due
process guidelines.178
A. Missing the Boat on Derivative Liability
By failing to reach a majority on the question of how punitive derivative liability
should be applied in maritime cases,179 the Supreme Court failed to fully resolve an
issue on which the circuits are split.180 Without guidance from the Supreme Court,
the circuit courts have promulgated three interpretations of when to apply punitive

171. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She stated that there was no “urgent need in maritime law to
break away from the ‘traditional common law approach under which punitive damages are determined by a
properly instructed jury, followed by trial-court, and then appellate-court review, to ensure that [the award] is
reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (alteration in original)).
172. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. See infra Part IV.A.
174. See infra Part IV.B.1.
175. See infra Part IV.B.2.
176. See infra Part IV.B.2.
177. See infra Part IV.B.3.
178. See infra Part IV.B.4.
179. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616 (2008) (describing the Court’s inability to reach
a majority on derivative liability and thus leaving the Ninth Circuit’s decision undisturbed); see also supra Part
III.A.
180. See supra Part II.A.
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derivative liability in maritime law, including: 1) the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the
Restatement; 2) the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s application of Nancy; and 3) the First
Circuit’s qualified Restatement rule.181
The Court should have adopted the Restatement rule, as applied in Protectus,
which states that a principal may be liable for the actions of a manager acting within
the scope of his or her employment.182 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Protectus,
the Restatement “better reflects the reality of modern corporate America,”183
because “a corporation can only act through its agents and employees.”184 With
growing globalization and increasing use of the corporate structure, “no reasonable
distinction can be made between the guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity
acting within the scope of his employment and the guilt of the corporation.”185 The
Fifth and Sixth Circuit rule requiring ratification by the corporation186 and the First
Circuit’s qualification of culpability are thus outdated and difficult to satisfy in the
modern corporate world because “no corporate executive or director would
approve the egregious acts to which punitive damages would attach,” thus plaintiffs
could only ever recover compensatory damages.187
Furthermore, scholars and the courts are moving toward unifying and clarifying
diverse law by adopting Restatements and Uniform Codes.188 The Exxon Court’s
inability to reach a decision on derivative liability has thus left application
inconsistent across the circuits.189
B. Using Common Law to Subvert a Clearer Due Process Channel
The Supreme Court wrongfully analyzed Exxon’s challenge to the size of the
punitive damage award. The Justices preempted the due process issue by granting
certiorari only to the maritime common law question and ignoring the due process
argument.190 The Court stated that Exxon’s challenge was “an issue of first
impression about punitive damages in maritime law,”191 when in reality it was an

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra Part II.C.
Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1386.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1386.
See, e.g., Fred H. Miller & Duchess Bartmess, Uniform Laws: Possible Useful Tribal Legislation, 36 TULSA
L.J. 305, 305 (2000) (stating that uniform laws “harmonize” differing laws and “make[] the law more
intelligible”(quoting WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 11 (1991))); ALI, About the American
Law Institute, http://www.ali.org/doc/thisIsALI.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (stating that American law’s two
chief defects are “its uncertainty and its complexity”).
189. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the circuit split on the question of maritime derivative liability).
190. See supra note 43; see also Brief in Opposition supra note 86, at 29.
191. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008).
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issue the Court should have decided based on well-settled due process case law192
and maritime statutes.193
In an attempt to render an outcome-based decision, the Court distinguished the
due process cases from the instant case.194 The Court alleged that the due process
cases were substantively based on state law and federal jurisdiction only arose due
to the constitutional challenges, while the Court’s jurisdiction in the instant case
was due to the fact that it was a maritime law challenge.195 On this basis, the Court
concluded that the punitive damages award must be reviewed under maritime
common law as opposed to due process law.196 Additionally, the Court asserted that
federal maritime common law authority precedes and precludes any application of
the due process standards, which set the outer limit for punitive damages awards.197
The Court’s reasoning is flawed in several ways. First, the Court should have
reviewed punitive damages under due process case law because the size of punitive
damages in this case and other maritime cases, have been treated solely as a due
process issue.198 Even if the Court was correct that federal maritime common law
obviates due process case law, then it should have taken into account maritime
statutes199 and prior federal maritime court decisions, which applied due process
standards to maritime punitive damages awards.200 Second, the Court did not rely
on any precedent and ignored maritime statutory law when it essentially usurped
Congress’s role and legislated a limit on punitive damages.201 The likely motivation
behind creating an arbitrary limitation was to limit Exxon’s liability, given the
enormous amount of expenses the company had already incurred.202 As a result of
the Court’s decision to create a new standard for maritime punitive damages that
precludes application of due process case law, the Court missed an opportunity to
clarify the recently muddled Gore guideposts.203
1. Prior Maritime Cases Used the Gore Guideposts to Evaluate Punitive Damages
The Court should have used fundamental guideposts announced in Gore to
determine the appropriate punitive damages without creating a new and arbitrary

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
Id.
Id. at 2626–27.
Id. at 2626.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part IV.B.4.
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standard.204 Regardless of how the Court attained jurisdiction, the issue of whether a
punitive damages award is excessive in maritime law is a due process issue.205 No
court had ever considered such a “maritime excessiveness argument resembling
Exxon’s” claim of a maritime common law punitive limit.206 Furthermore, as
respondents argued, Exxon had likely waived its rights to such a claim in actions in
the Ninth Circuit because Exxon “told the Ninth Circuit there was no need to reach
the issue” of punitive damage limitations under maritime law and the lower court
did not even address the issue.207 Exxon cited to the ability “of [state] common-law
courts to make rules governing punitive damages” as its argument for a federal
maritime common law standard.208 However, just because state common law has the
ability to cap punitive damages,209 does not mean such a cap is required or even
necessary, particularly when there is no legal history of one.210
For instance, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case used the Gore guideposts to
determine that the $5 billion verdict against Exxon was excessive and ultimately cut
it in half.211 In fact, Exxon had primarily argued on constitutional grounds and the

204.
205.

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
For examples of cases that reached the federal courts through maritime jurisdiction and used due
process, not common law analysis, see In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241–43 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (analyzing the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions under
Gore); CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing, pre-Gore, that the Supreme
Court “rejected a ‘mathematical bright line’ approach to the award of punitive damages” (citing Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991))); Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (using Gore’s guide-posts in a maritime case to affirm punitive damages of $7 million when the court
awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages).
206. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29.
207. Id. at 28–29.
208. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at 22.
209. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 438 (2003) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the ability of states to regulate punitive damages with state statute and common law
rather than the outer limits used in a constitutional review).
210. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29. Even if the Court was correct in determining that federal
maritime common law obviates due process law, the Court should only apply an abuse of discretion standard to
evaluate the lower court’s decision, rather than creating an arbitrary ratio. See Brief for Respondents at 53,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219) (“When no constitutional issue is raised, the
role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court’s determination
[concerning the size of the award] under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” (quoting Cooper Indus. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted))). So
long as a trial court has supported its decision with sufficient evidence and explained “why the award satisfies
governing standards,” this standard is met. Id. at 54 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–25
(1991)). Further, even if the Court wanted to create a new common-law standard, such a standard “should
mirror the three [guideposts] that this Court has prescribed as a matter of substantive due process (and which
themselves are largely derived from common law), so as to ensure that punitive awards receive consistent
review.” Id. at 57.
211. See In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding and stating the punitive
award must be reduced in light of BMW and Cooper Industries); In Re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2007) (In Re Exxon Valdez III) (stating that the punitive damages are “not warranted” and reducing them
to $2.5 billion).
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Ninth Circuit analyzed the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions.212 While determining
“that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible because it knew of the risk of an oil spill in
the transportation of huge quantities of oil through the icy waters of Prince William
Sound[] [a]nd it knew Hazelwood was an alcoholic” the Ninth Circuit stated that
many “factors reduce reprehensibility” before it remanded the case back to the
district court to consider a reduction in light of due process cases.213 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit used the Gore guidepost factors to appropriately limit the punitive damages
in the instant case.214
Furthermore, maritime due process case law suggests that bright-line ratios
should not be used to determine punitive damages. In the pre-Gore maritime case
CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, the First Circuit cited non-maritime Supreme Court case
law that “rejected a ‘mathematical bright line’ approach to the award of punitive
damages.”215 In CEH, the court refused to reduce punitive damages against a captain
for $10,000 and against the ship’s owner, for $50,000 when the compensatory
awards were less than $7000.216 In its analysis, the First Circuit did not investigate
ratios and standards to apply a separate maritime common law standard.217
Additionally, maritime cases after Gore used Gore’s due process analysis to affirm
punitive damages that were not a 1:1 ratio. In Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,218
the Southern District of New York refused to overturn a $7 million punitive award
when the compensatory damages were only $2.6 million for passengers who
contracted Legionnaires’ Disease on the defendant’s cruise ship.219 The cruise line’s
conduct was considered “sufficiently wanton” to merit punitive damages when it
was “aware that [its] whirlpool spas presented [an] increased risk of illness,
including Legionnaires’ Disease” and that its spas had faulty filters.220 Using the Gore
guideposts, the court stated the defendants were liable, including that they were
“sufficiently blameworthy” and that the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages
was not excessive compared to the harm inflicted.221
In conclusion, it seems clear that the issue of excessive punitive damages in
maritime law is a due process issue and maritime courts should use due process case
law to analyze the excessiveness of punitive damages rather than create an arbitrary
standard.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 25.
In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1242.
Id. at 1240–41.
70 F.2d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 705–06.
171 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 262.
Id. Notably, the court did not use a different “maritime” standard to determine the validity of the
punitive award. Id.
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2. Judicial Activism: Throwing Legislative Intent Overboard
The Exxon Court essentially legislated a 1:1 ratio despite the fact that there have
been no prior judicial decisions or congressional action mandating a strict ratio in
maritime punitive damages.222 The Supreme Court ignored due process cases like
Gore and State Farm223 when it created a new rule for maritime punitive damages
and instead examined verbal or quantitative methods used by different states,224
notably adopted only through legislation.225 In fact, the Court would not even
address due process case law because it only granted certiorari to the maritime
common law question.226
Judicial activism is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as instances where “judges
allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their
decisions.”227 As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, maritime law is a mix of
judicially mandated standards and statutes,228 but the Court should not step into a
legislative function when “a legislative body . . . [is] better equipped to perform the
task at hand.”229 Many commentators have urged judicial deference to Congress and
specifically argued against judicial activism in maritime law and noted (before
Exxon) that the Supreme Court was providing “substantial deference to Congress’
role in fashioning maritime law.”230 Commentators argue for deference, stating that
while federal courts may supplement legislation, Congress retains “superior
authority over the development of maritime law” particularly since it has
“‘legislated extensively in these areas.’”231
Arguably, Congress legislated all of the punitive restrictions it intended to make
when it only prohibited punitive damages where there was wrongdoing by the agent
with the principal’s privity or knowledge in the Limitations Act.232 Any argument
that maritime common law limited liability should be obviated by the Limitations

222. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2637 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
(stating that the majority could not cite one judicial decision where a court imposed a precise ratio).
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2623 (majority opinion).
225. Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that legislatures, not courts, have adopted
ratios to limit punitive damages).
226. See supra note 43.
227. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
228. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634–35.
229. See id. at 2635 (quoting Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations omitted)).
230. See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Introduction: The Osceola After 100 Years: Its Meaning and Effect on Maritime
Personal Injury Law in the United States, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613–14 (2003).
231. Id. (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 28 (1990)).
232. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (discussing the Limitations Act to illustrate that the absence of a statute
limiting damages of the sort in Exxon indicates that Congress has no desire to create any such “new rule
restricting the liability of a wrongdoer like Exxon”); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). Exxon did not attempt to
argue the Limitation Act applied because of the difficulty it would face alleging Captain Hazelwood’s actions
were not within the company’s “privity or knowledge.” Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635–36.
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Act, where Congress created its own restrictions.233 Furthermore, in the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act (“TAPAA”), Congress capped compensatory
liability in certain oil spills, but “it did not restrict the availability of punitive
damages.”234 Additionally, compensatory damages for intangible injuries, such as
pain and suffering or pure economic loss “absent direct physical damage to
property or proprietary interest” are historically awarded less-liberally in maritime
law than other areas, thus providing another good reason not to cap punitive
damages.235 Essentially, the Exxon Court ignored statutory intent and case law that
emphasized that “an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the wellconsidered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”236
Further, the Court fully overstepped its bounds by analyzing empirical data to
determine the correct ratio to apply, despite numerous decisions that have
emphasized that Congress should make such analyses.237 The Court’s examination
of median punitive amounts and state ratios substitutes the will of the judiciary for
that of Congress, which “is better able to evaluate [such ratios] than is this
Court.”238 Though the majority argued that “the Judiciary has traditionally taken the
lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime,”239 the Court
failed to take into account that Congress had already clearly indicated its
unwillingness to remove or restrict punitive damages where there is egregiousness
and wrongdoing.240 Even if there was some ambiguity as to whose role it is to create
limits on punitive damages, courts agree that deciding remedies should be left up to
Congress.241
Additionally, the Court bypassed due process punitive damage case law, which
specifically states that the judiciary will not adopt a particular ratio.242 Although
State Farm states that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process,”243 the case does not

233.
234.
235.

Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29.
See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636.
See id. at 2636–37 (quoting 1 T. SCHEONBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14-7 (4th ed. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted)). “[I]t appears that maritime law continues to treat such [intangible] injuries as
less than fully compensable, or not compensable at all.” Id. at 2637. “Accordingly, there may be less reason to
limit punitive damages in this sphere than there would be in any other.” Id.
236. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
237. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2637–38 & n.7 (arguing that Congress is better apt than the judiciary to analyze
large quantities of data).
238. See id. at 2636.
239. See id. at 2630 n.21 (majority opinion).
240. See id. at 2635–36 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing congressional intent in statutes
such as the Limitations Act and TAPAA).
241. See id. at 2637 n.7 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982)).
242. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003).
243. Id. at 425.
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foreclose the judiciary from seeking punitive damages beyond that ratio.244 The facts
of Exxon, particularly the egregiousness of Hazelwood’s actions and Exxon’s preexisting knowledge of his alcohol problem, would seemingly be the archetypal case
in which the court would want to go beyond the single-digit ratio.245 While the
events in Exxon may not merit the $5 billion reward initially granted, the Ninth
Circuit considered the “guidepost” factors246and ultimately avoided such a high
ratio, reducing the award to $2.5 billion.247 The Court’s decision to create a
maximum 1:1 ratio prevented both the Exxon Court and future maritime courts
from considering the egregiousness of the case in awarding punitive damages.248
Thus, by creating a new arbitrary standard, ignoring maritime statutes, and not
utilizing due process cases that explicitly avoid setting a ratio on punitive damages,
the Court improperly legislated a maximum 1:1 ratio from the bench.249
3. The Court Created an Outcome-Based Standard for Limiting Punitive Damages in
Maritime Cases
The Court may have been motivated to create a 1:1 ratio in order to prevent Exxon
from paying more damages when it had already paid billions of dollars to the
United States government, the State of Alaska, and other plaintiffs.250 The Justices
set the stage for this ruling by granting certiorari only to the maritime common law
question251 and ignoring the years of litigation and analysis on due process case law


244. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a punitive
damages award equal to a ratio 12.5 times the compensatory damages award was not a violation of due process).
245. See supra Part I (discussing Hazelwood’s alcoholism); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
575 (1996) (explaining that the “degree of reprehensibility” guidepost is the most important factor in
determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award). The State Farm Court described the
reprehensibility analysis:
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was
the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
538 U.S. at 418.
246. See In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit, using the due process
cases, analyzed the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions. Id.
247. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008).
248. See id. at 2634 (stating the maximum “punitive-to-compensatory ratio” is now 1:1 in maritime law).
249. See id.
250. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (discussing the amount of damages Exxon already paid); see Barry Friedman,
The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258 (2005) (stating that some analysts argue that judges base
decisions on “influences . . . other than an independent judgment of the law”). Other influences include policy
outcomes, for example, that the court did not want Exxon to have to spend any more money on damages than
they already had. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
251. See supra note 43.
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that took place in the Ninth Circuit and district court.252 The Supreme Court’s
actions are even more confusing because the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the
maritime common law claim.253 The Court’s decision supports the view of some
scholars that votes on writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court are “preliminary
strategic judgments on the merits.”254 In this case, by eliminating the due process
issue, the Justices could make a more narrowly tailored ruling that would provide
for substantial limits on punitive damages in this one case and in maritime law,
without affecting other areas of the law through a due process analysis.255
Analysts claim that judges are often motivated by external factors, beyond legal
considerations when making judicial decisions.256 Instead of being “motivated
primarily to decide cases based upon an independent assessment of the law and
facts,” judges may make decisions to reach “the outcome they prefer.”257 After
framing the question to its liking, the Court went out of its way in its opinion to
detail the significant amount of money that Exxon had already paid stating: “Exxon
spent around $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts,” and that Exxon settled civil cases by
paying “$900 million toward restoring natural resources” and “another $303
million in voluntary settlements.”258 Thus, the Court strongly hinted it was
concerned that Exxon had, in the Court’s view, paid sufficient damages.259 This
reasoning may have caused the Court to use maritime common law as an excuse to
limit punitive damages so that Exxon would be spared additional costs.260 Such an
argument is compelling in this case because previous maritime case law used the
due process guidelines without considering common law restrictions.261
Furthermore, the full impact of this decision is likely to be felt for years, if not
decades, as parties around the Gulf of Mexico deal with the recent April 20, 2010 BP
oil spill that continues to destroy pristine environmental wildlife and decimate

252. See supra note 43; Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 25 (stating that the Ninth Circuit “reviewed the
Phase III verdict only under the Due Process Clause,” in part because of Exxon’s request to analyze due process
before any common-law considerations).
253. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29 (“[N]either the district court nor the Ninth Circuit passed on
the issue [of punitive damage limitations under maritime common law].”).
254. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 12
(1991).
255. See generally Victoria Lockard & Anna A. Summer, United States: Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker:
Chipping Away At Punitive Damages Awards, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Aug. 27, 2008 (“The Exxon [sic] decision
is precedent only in the context of maritime law.”).
256. See Friedman, supra note 250, at 270–71. This case note does not allege that the Justices considered
Justice Alito’s stock ownership when making their decision. See Barnes, supra note 3 (discussing Justice Alito’s
recusal from the case due to stock ownership in Exxon).
257. See Friedman, supra note 250, at 270.
258. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
259. See id.
260. See id. (citing the numerous payments Exxon had made to attempt the rectify the damage caused by the
oil spill). See generally Friedman, supra note 250, at 270–71 (discussing potential sources of external influence
on judicial opinions).
261. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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industries such as commercial fishing.262 The Exxon 1:1 compensatory to punitive
damages limitation will affect any potential future litigation against BP, such as
lawsuits claiming that egregious actions led to these current and impending
economic losses. 263
4. The Court Should Have Used This Opportunity to Clarify the Gore Guideposts
Finally, in bypassing a due process analysis, the Court missed an opportunity to
precisely define the guidelines established in Gore and later modified in Williams.264
In Williams the Supreme Court stated that harm to non-parties could be considered
in the reprehensibility of conduct guidepost, but paradoxically stated harm to nonparties could not be considered.265 Scholars have noted that the Williams case
created confusion over when harm to a non-party could be used in the punitive
damage analysis.266 Since the oil spill in the Exxon case caused harm to various nonparties such as fishermen and Native Alaskans, it would have been an ideal time for


262. On April 20, 2010, BP-owned oil rig, Deepwater Horizon, exploded and sunk, spilling thousands of
gallons of oil daily from its source into the Gulf of Mexico. See generally Next Step to Stop Oil: Throw Garbage at
It, CNN.COM, May 11, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/09/gulf.oil/index. Html (discussing the April 20,
2010 explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig in the Gulf of Mexico and the subsequent oil spill); White
House Raises Specter of Misconduct in Oil Spill, FOXNEWS.COM, May 5, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2010/ 05/05/bp-costs-add [hereinafter White House Raises Spector] (discussing environmental and
economic repurcussions of the BP oil spill). The oil leak has continued unabated for weeks and as of the date of
this publication, BP has failed to stop it. White House Raises Spector, supra.
263. See White House Raises Spector, supra note 262. Many commentators have stated concerns that BP
cannot be held liable for more than $75 million in economic losses because of restrictions under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, which was passed after the Exxon Valdez spill. Id.; see also Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). However, the cap on
economic damages does not apply “if somebody is found to be either grossly negligent, conduct willful—
involved in willful misconduct, or in violation of federal regulations.” White House Raises Spector, supra note
262 (quoting White House Communications Director, Dan Pfeiffer). Thus, if BP’s actions were egregious
enough to implicate punitive liability for the oil spill, parties could seek compensatory damages higher than $75
million, but they would still be restricted by the 1:1 compensatory to punitive damages ratio mandated by
Exxon. While an investigation into the cause of the spill is still ongoing, any punitive damages claims that could
arise from it will thus be limited.
264. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
265. Id. at 355.
266. See Parcells, supra note 104, at 27. Parcells laments:
The Baker [sic] case presented an opportunity to clarify how a judge is to instruct a jury with
respect to whether harm to third parties (parties other than the plaintiffs) can be considered by a
jury when determining the reprehensibility of the offense and if punitive damages are warranted,
but then to disregard that information in determining the amount of the award. However, since the
Supreme Court in Baker specifically refused to address the due process claim asserted by Exxon . . .
the due process issue on punitive damages awards will continue to confuse juries, judges and
practitioners alike.
Id.
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the Court to clarify a confusing Gore guidepost.267 Such clarification will have to be
addressed in a future case, leaving lower courts without direction for now.268
Thus, the Court created a new standard to prevent higher costs for Exxon rather
than relying on sufficient due process guidelines that had aided earlier maritime
court decisions and missed an opportunity to clarify confusing case law about when
non-parties may bring punitive damage claims.269
v. conclusion

The Exxon Court’s failure to reach a majority on the issue of punitive derivative
liability prevented the Court from resolving a circuit split over the rule for
derivative liability by adopting a uniform Restatement rule on derivative liability.270
Further, by framing the issue solely on maritime common law, the Court did not
follow punitive damages due process case law,271 but rather, arbitrarily limited
punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages when the Court should
have deferred to Congress instead of legislating from the bench.272 In reaching its
decision, the Exxon Court missed an opportunity to clarify confusing due process
case law273 and has potentially given the maritime industry an easier standard on
damages than other industries.274 For instance, any punitive claims by commercial
fisherman or other injured plaintiffs from the recent 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico oil
spill will be restricted by the Exxon rule.275 Innocent parties with punitive damages
claims may feel the full impact of the Supreme Court’s decision to mandate a 1:1
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages in maritime law, as punitive
damages against BP, if found responsible for any egregious actions, will be severely
limited.276 Time will tell if this limit on punitive damages will serve as less of a
deterrent against tortious behavior by the maritime industry than its land-based
counterparts, but in an effort to limit damages against Exxon,277 the Court legislated
a ratio that only stirs the already stormy seas of punitive-damage analysis.


267. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611 (stating that the issues presented in the case involve analysis of punitive
damages).
268. See Parcells, supra note 104 at 27–28.
269. See supra Part IV.B.1
270. See supra Part IV.A.
271. See supra Part IV.B.1.
272. See supra Part IV.B.2.
273. See supra Part IV.B.4.
274. See generally Lockard & Summer, supra note 255.
275. See supra Part IV.B.3.
276. See supra Part IV.B.3.
277. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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